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I. INTRODUCTION 
We know little about what law professors do and how they spend their 
time.1  While we know law professors’ teaching loads, we do not know how 
many hours they spend preparing for classes, interacting with students outside 
of the classroom, developing and grading assignments, updating their syllabi, 
or otherwise investing in their teaching skills, let alone how they spend their 
 
* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  I thank 
Arthur Best, Nora Engstrom, Bruce Green, Beto Juarez, Justin Marceau, Chad Oldfather, Russ Pearce, 
Steve Pepper, Deborah Rhode, Ryan Scoville, Amanda Seligman, Bill Simon, Joyce Sterling, Robin 
West, Annecoos Wiersema, and David Wilkins for comments and conversations about this Essay, and 
Diane Burkhardt, Faculty Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law, for her outstanding research assistance. 
1. This dearth of knowledge is not unique to law professors.  See John Ziker, The Long, Lonely 
Job of Homo Academicus: Focusing the Research Lens on the Professor’s Own Schedule, BLUE 
REVIEW (Mar. 31, 2014), https://thebluereview.org/faculty-time-allocation/ [https://perma.cc/7ZEG-
GUFK] (describing the first stage of a pioneering study of academics’ time allocation at Boise State 
University).  
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time pursuing all of these activities.  Similarly, while we know quite a bit about 
how much law professors publish and about the quality and impact of their 
scholarship, we do not know how they identify topics for inquiry, research, 
write, and publish, or how much time they spend on these endeavors.  Finally, 
while we know a fair amount about law professors’ service commitment, such 
as their committee assignments and public speaking engagements, we do not 
know how much time and how they spend their time on service activities.  In 
short, we know very little about law professors’ work habits.   
What we do not know matters.  Law professors’ work habits can inform the 
development of best practices and benchmarks in legal academia, as well as 
reveal aggregate patterns regarding how law professors spend their time.  In 
turn, these insights can be used for mentoring and training junior faculty; 
informing individual and institutional decision-making about resource 
allocation; improving teaching, scholarship, and service work habits; and 
informing normative discussions about what law professors and law schools 
should be doing in the face of mounting criticisms of legal education.  Yet the 
diagnostic virtues of timekeeping may be inherently intertwined with 
destructive time management qualities inconsistent with the intellectual and 
contemplative core mission and objectives of legal academia. 
This Essay imagines a world in which law professors tracked their work 
hours, recording how much time they spent teaching, researching, and on 
service, as well as brief descriptions of their activities.2  What would such a 
world look like?  Part II identifies some of the diagnostic attributes of the 
academic “billable” hour, explores the potential destructive dark side of 
timekeeping, and examines the nature of the relationship between the diagnostic 
and destructive qualities of recording academic time.  While foreign to 
academic lawyers, the billable hour has been a feature of law practice for a 
while now; Part III introduces some of the insights and lessons law professors 
might learn from lawyers, chief among these the need to separate the diagnostic 
virtues of timekeeping from adverse punitive compensation consequences and 
the wisdom of putting in place an apparatus of ethical time recording before 
purporting to implement academic timekeeping.  Part IV imagines some of the 
political implications of recording academic time, and Part V briefly explores 
some of the normative discussions timekeeping might help inform. 
 
 
 
 
2. See infra note 19 and accompanying text; infra Part III (comparing law professors recording 
their time to lawyers tracking the billable hour). 
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II. IMAGINING THE ACADEMIC “BILLABLE” HOUR:  
DIAGNOSTIC INSIGHTS AND DESTRUCTIVE QUALITIES 
We know very little about law professors’ work habits.3  Academic 
timekeeping is likely to generate ample data and knowledge about what law 
professors do, yielding significant diagnostic insights informing individual, 
institutional, and systemic decision-making in legal academia.  At the same 
time, however, timekeeping’s dark side may undermine the very mission and 
culture of the academic enterprise in law schools.   
A. The Diagnostic Virtues of Academic Timekeeping 
Imagining what legal academia would look like if law professors were to 
record their time, we might start with the world as we know it: one without 
timekeeping.   
First, consider scholarship.  We do have ample data about the quality of 
legal scholarship.4  At the hiring stage, law schools carefully scrutinize the 
quality of candidates’ scholarship based on the expertise available on their 
appointments committee and faculty, increasingly a meaningful examination 
because entry-level candidates commonly have more than one published paper 
available.5  Similarly, promotion to tenure decisions entail a close examination 
of candidates’ work informed by the insights of outside reviewers who are 
experts in the relevant fields of study.6  In addition, high quality published work 
tends to be recognized, discussed, engaged with, and cited by courts, policy 
makers, and peers with relevant subject-matter expertise.  Next, in recent years, 
some preliminary limited evidence has emerged regarding the scholarly 
productivity of law professors.7  Admittedly, some of the productivity data is 
 
3. See, e.g., Stephanie Davidson, Way Beyond Legal Research: Understanding the Research 
Habits of Legal Scholars, 102 L. LIBR. J. 561, 562–63 (2010) (documenting our scant knowledge of 
law professors’ scholarly habits). 
4. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327–30 (2002) [hereinafter 
Rhode, Legal Scholarship]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE: SCHOLARS, STATUS, 
AND ACADEMIC CULTURE 29–62 (2006) [hereinafter RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE]. 
5. Emily Zimmerman, Should Law Professors Have a Continuing Practice Experience (CPE) 
Requirement?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 131, 137 (2013). 
6. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Tenure, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 160 (2003). 
7. Orin Kerr, Law Faculty Productivity Over Time, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/18/law-faculty-productivity-
over-time/?utm_term=.0498e581f3d8 [http://perma.cc/8WFN-WLRK] [hereinafter Kerr, Law Faculty 
Productivity Over Time]; Orin Kerr, Law Faculty Productivity at Different Career Stages, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/01/14/law-
faculty-productivity-at-different-career-stages/?utm_term=.c00899e5dec1 [http://perma.cc/UNL2-
Y44L] [hereinafter Kerr, Law Faculty Productivity at Different Career Stages].  Outside of law 
schools, some universities have sought to gather quantitative information about faculty productivity 
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rather crude, for example, excluding books, yet we are beginning to know more 
about quantitative productivity.8  Finally, impact indexes have recently become 
more popular, ranging from law professors’ scholarly citation counts to Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN) downloads.9  Like their productivity 
counterparts, these measures are often quite inexact.  Citation counts often do 
not exclude self-citations (a professor citing his own previous work will pick 
up citation counts), and do not distinguish between types of citations (ranging 
from a substantive engagement with the key arguments made in the paper, to 
brief substantive references, to a citation to an esoteric point made in the paper 
or a string citation).  SSRN downloads are similarly subject to some 
manipulation.10  Nonetheless, we know quite a bit about the quality, 
productivity, and impact of legal scholars and legal scholarship. 
In contrast, we virtually know nothing about law professors’ habits of 
scholarship.11  “How to” style guides purport to instruct new law professors 
about the scholarly craft, how to identify topics, research, write, and publish.12  
However, there is almost no empirical analysis examining whether this sage 
advice is followed by law professors.  Consequently, we do not know how law 
professors select topics for research, how they research, how much time they 
dedicate to their research, how and when they write, how they publish, and what 
 
with the help of private analytics companies. See Colleen Flaherty, Refusing to be Evaluated by a 
Formula, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 11, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/12/11/rutgers-professors-object-contract-academic-
analytics [https://perma.cc/DM2E-RUY5].  In response, the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) has cautioned universities against the adoption of alluring metrics that lack 
qualitative dimensions.  See Statement on “Academic Analytics” and Research Metrics, AAUP (Mar. 
22, 2016), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/AcademicAnalytics_statement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WL2K-M3D7].   
8. Kerr, Law Faculty Productivity Over Time, supra note 7; Kerr, Law Faculty Productivity at 
Different Career Stages, supra note 7. 
9. Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Citations, Justifications, and the Troubled State of 
Legal Scholarship: An Empirical Study, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 45, 78 (2015); Robert Steinbuch, On the 
Leiter Side: Developing a Universal Assessment Tool for Measuring Scholarly Output by Law 
Professors and Ranking Law Schools, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 91 (2011). 
10. Different users post different types of papers on the database, some short and light on 
substance.   
11. Davidson, supra note 3, at 562–63; Rhode, Legal Scholarship, supra note 4, at 1327–30. 
12. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams, Sing Muse: Legal Scholarship for New Law Teachers, 37 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1, 13 (1987); C. Steven Bradford, As I Lay Writing: How to Write Law Review Articles 
for Fun and Profit, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13, 14 (1994); Richard Delgado, How to Write a Law Review 
Article, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 445, 445 (1986); Mary Kay Kane, Some Thoughts on Scholarship for 
Beginning Teachers, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 14 (1987); James Boyd White, Why I Write, 53 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1996); Mary Beth Beazley & Linda H. Edwards, The Process and the 
Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship About Legal Scholarship, 49 MERCER L. REV. 741, 741–42 
(1998). 
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constitutes “best scholarly practices” (and for that matter, “worst practices” 
either). 
In a historical context, knowing so little about the habits of legal scholarship 
is not surprising.  Until recently we knew relatively little about law practice in 
general,13 rendering our ignorance about academic law practice par for the 
course.  Since we did not know about what lawyers do, how they practice, and 
the challenges they face, it was hardly a surprise that we did not know what 
academic lawyers—that is, law professors—do.  Appropriately, the practice of 
law is now the subject of robust empirical study and academic law practice 
ought not to be exempt from the very scrutiny lawyers are subjected to.14   
Now imagine what we would learn if law professors were to record their 
scholarly time.  To begin with, consider a productive law professor who 
produces high quality work.  Timekeeping would reveal how much time she 
spends on her scholarship and how she spends it, and would help generate 
valuable best practices in terms of identifying topics of inquiry, habits, and 
strategies for conducting research, writing, and publishing.  In addition, the data 
can help establish benchmarks for different types of scholarly projects ranging 
from short essays and book reviews to articles and book projects. 
Next, consider a law professor who is not particularly productive but 
publishes high quality work.  Timekeeping insights could equally contribute to 
generating valuable data and learning from the work habits of others.  To the 
extent that one is unproductive because of investing insufficient time in her 
scholarship or pursuing ineffective scholarly habits, benchmarks generated by 
more productive colleagues who publish high quality work could inform the 
law professor’s habits and decisions regarding time allocation.  As importantly, 
tracking the time of those who invest ample time to produce high quality work 
but publish infrequently may shed important light on work habits and help 
 
13. David B. Wilkins, The Professional Responsibility of Professional Schools to Study and 
Teach About the Profession, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76, 80 (1999). 
14. Indeed, the body of empirical studies of the legal profession is vast.  Notable scholarship 
includes After the JD, a comprehensive national empirical study designed to explore the careers of 
lawyers admitted to the bar in 2000 over the course of their professional lives.  See RONIT DINOVITZER 
ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., AFTER THE JD II: 
SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS  12 (2009); RONIT DINOVITZER ET 
AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND. FOR LAW CAREER RESEARCH & EDUC., AFTER THE JD III: 
THIRD RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 14 (2014).  Other scholarship includes 
studies of different practice settings and lawyers’ identities, ranging from Big Law to lawyers in the 
individual hemisphere.  Compare MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991), with Leslie C. Levin, Guardians at the Gate: 
The Backgrounds, Career Paths, and Professional Development of Private US Immigration Lawyers, 
34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 399 (2009), and Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: 
Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2014) (discussing rural lawyers). 
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generate more nuanced best practices and benchmarks for an array of legal 
publications. 
At the same time, we have a lot to learn from those who regularly publish 
mediocre work.  Here too, timekeeping may reveal valuable information about 
work habits.  It can help diagnose insufficient time commitments, assessed both 
given one’s recorded scholarly hours and against the benchmarks generated by 
colleagues producing high quality work, and thus inform individual and 
institutional decisions regarding allocation of research and writing resources.  
Moreover, those who produce relatively poor-quality work notwithstanding 
committing long hours to their scholarship may help reveal insights about 
ineffective or “worst” work habits and may in turn learn from the best practices 
of productive high-quality colleagues.  Finally, were those who produce 
comparatively little scholarship of relative low quality to record their time, the 
data generated could help us understand, identify, and avoid poor and 
unproductive work habits.  All of this knowledge could be used to train and 
mentor new scholars as well as assist struggling law professors, improve 
scholarly habits, and inform individual and institutional decision-making about 
scholarship.   
Second, consider teaching.  As is the case with scholarship, we already 
know quite a bit about how much law professors teach, the quality of the 
instruction, and its impact.  Specifically, we know law professors’ course loads 
and how many students they teach; we know some about the quality of their 
teaching as assessed by colleagues during promotion processes and by student 
evaluations; and we have some information about the impact of law professors’ 
teaching, if only anecdotally from former students.15   
Yet there is so much we do not know and could find out if law professors 
were to record their teaching time.  How much time and how do law professors 
prepare for their classes?  Does the preparation time and manner of preparation 
vary across different types of classes (big required classes, small required 
classes, electives, seminars, etc.) and how so?  Does it in turn impact quality of 
teaching and learning?  How much time and how do law professors spend time 
with their students outside of the classroom explaining materials, advising, and 
mentoring?  How much time and what strategies are deployed to develop and 
grade class exercises and exams?  To keep current with class materials and to 
revise syllabi?  Timekeeping would help answer all of these questions and 
more, generating best (and worst) practices, benchmarks, and knowledge about 
 
15. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 63–87; Gregory W. Bowman, The 
Comparative and Absolute Advantages of Junior Law Faculty: Implications for Teaching and the 
Future of American Law Schools, 2008 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 171, 195 (2008). 
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teaching.  In turn, these insights can be used to improve law professors’ 
teaching and students’ learning. 
Third, we know some about the visible aspects of law professors’ service 
inside and outside of their law schools, from committee assignments and 
service to public speaking engagements to commenting on other colleagues’ 
work.16  If law professors were to keep their time, however, we would know so 
much more about their service work habits.  How much time and how do law 
professors serve on committees in and outside of law schools?  Consult or offer 
pro bono legal services?17  Contribute to law reform efforts?  Speak about their 
work or otherwise?  Author or contribute to amicus briefs? 
In sum, we know very little about what law professors do.  We know 
practically nothing about law professors’ habits of scholarship.  We do not 
know how and why law professors identify possible topics for research, when 
and how often they research and write, how and to what extent they interact 
with others’ work, how much time they dedicate to any particular scholarly 
project and to scholarship in general, what projects they are working on, and 
how they approach and decide where to publish.  While teaching loads are easy 
to observe, we know little about how law professors prepare for classes and 
how much time and how they spend time with students outside of the 
classroom.  We also know little about law professors’ service.  While certain 
service components are easily observable, like committee assignments, we 
generally do not know how much time and how law professors serve within and 
outside of their institutions. 
What we do not know matters.  This is not a generic argument about the 
benefits of “informational regulation,” pursuant to which more data is always 
better than less data because additional information about work habits would 
allow law professors and other legal academia actors to be generally more 
informed and better positioned to make decisions regarding the allocation of 
time.18  Rather, if law professors were to learn from lawyers and record their 
time,19 keeping track of both how much time they spend on various tasks as 
well as of what they actually do when performing aspects of their job, we could, 
specifically, use the data to generate best scholarly, teaching, and service habits 
(and avoid worst habits) as well as establish benchmarks for various tasks. 
 
16. RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 88–115. 
17. See David Luban, Faculty Pro Bono and the Question of Identity, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 58 
(1999). 
18. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161–63 (1982) (discussing 
informational regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: 
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999). 
19. WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY 
ATTORNEYS 17 (1996). 
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Notably, the diagnostic insights of timekeeping reach far beyond generating 
best practices and benchmarks that may inform individual decision-making by 
law professors regarding their work habits; they also reach into institutional and 
systemic decision-making by law schools and legal academia.   
Poor training and mentoring, an increasingly well-documented 
phenomenon in the practice of law,20 has been a familiar theme in legal 
academia in part because law schools have little in the way of accumulated 
knowledge to impart on newcomers to the practice of academic law.21  Indeed, 
while teaching, scholarship, and service have long defined the essence of what 
law professors do, we know so little about what academic lawyers do: 
It’s as if by virtue of having gone to law school and having 
attended a few lectures over three years and having read a few 
excerpts in law review articles, one is supposed to know when 
one becomes a law professor what to do, how to teach, how to 
write, what is scholarship, what is teaching, and what is 
service.  There’s a significant gap there.22  
Timekeeping resulting in robust insights about what law professors do and 
how they do it well would constitute the very body of knowledge law schools 
could use to train and mentor junior faculty members, providing guidance into 
the core practices of teaching, scholarship, and service.  Best practices, the 
avoidance of bad practices, and benchmarks for effective teaching, scholarship, 
and service are exactly the kind of knowledge-based advice junior colleagues 
need in order to make informed decisions about how to allocate their time and 
resources for becoming great law professors. 
Within and across law schools, aggregated findings regarding scholarship, 
teaching, and service hours may generate valuable institutional data.  For 
example, do men and women faculty members shoulder equal burdens of 
service and teaching in terms of hours spent at work?23  Do they invest equally 
in their scholarship?  Do junior and senior faculty members shoulder equal 
 
20. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law 
Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC. L. REV. 239, 281–82 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fortney, Soul for Sale]; Susan Saab Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to be Ethical: Addressing 
the Effects of Billable Hour Pressure, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 305, 310 (2003) [hereinafter Fortney, I Don’t 
Have Time to be Ethical]; Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the 
Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 179 (2005) [hereinafter Fortney, The 
Billable Hours Derby]. 
21. See supra note 12. 
22. Transcript—Conference on the Ethics of Legal Scholarship, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1083, 1093 
(2018) (Eli Wald). 
23. Eli Wald, BigLaw Identity Capital: Pink and Blue, Black and White, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2509, 2511 (2015) (discussing the disproportionate service burden on women lawyers at large law 
firms). 
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burdens?  In a world in which law professors were to record their time, law 
schools would be able to answer these questions and use the information—
along with existing data about quality, quantity, and impact of scholarship, 
teaching, and service—to make informed decisions about the allocation of 
resources in legal academia. 
If it turns out, for example, that tenure-track junior faculty dedicate 
disproportionate time to teaching, law schools would be able to better assess 
how time is spent, direct resources to those who might need assistance, and 
consider granting pre-tenure leaves to allow junior colleagues to focus on their 
scholarship.  If aggregated timekeeping data revealed that women faculty 
disproportionately shoulder administrative and service burdens at law schools 
compared with their male counterparts, law schools could take measures to 
ensure that all faculty members have more equal opportunities to invest in their 
teaching and writing, thus protecting some from over-service.  Or, if recorded 
time established that women faculty disproportionately perform emotional 
labor at law schools,24 managing the displayed feelings and emotions of 
students, faculty, and staff inherent in the stressful environment of law schools, 
the institutions could either pay for this labor or spread it more equally among 
all law professors.   
Imagining legal academia informed by the insights of law professors’ 
timekeeping, however, should not exaggerate its benefits.  While the diagnostic 
virtues of timekeeping—learning about law professors’ work habits, generating 
best practices and benchmarks, establishing a body of knowledge for purposes 
of training and mentoring, and revealing patterns of work allocation among 
faculty members—would be significant, they ought not distract us or belittle 
the inherent importance of quality, productivity, impact, talent, and skill.  
Developing solid work habits is important and likely to improve law professors’ 
scholarship, teaching, and service, yet it is no substitute and no guarantee of 
quality, productivity, and impact.25  Put differently, adhering to effective work 
habits is a necessary but insufficient condition for being a good law professor.  
In addition to putting in effort measured in terms of hours worked, one has to 
be a quality, productive, and impactful law professor.  What we do not know 
about law professors’ work habits ought to supplement but not replace what we 
do know about the quality, quantity, and impact of law professors’ teaching, 
scholarship, and service. 
 
24. See generally Amy S. Wharton, The Psychosocial Consequences of Emotional Labor, 561 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 159–60 (1999).  
25. Eli Wald, Success, Merit, and Capital in America, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 42 (2017). 
WALD 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:09 AM 
1000 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:991 
B. The Destructive Qualities of Academic Timekeeping 
Timekeeping’s dark side is its managerial quality, part and parcel of the 
“new public management” attitude, an organizational style sweeping through 
public agencies calling for “doing more with less” by adopting private 
industries’ techniques of “doing business.”26  For universities and law schools 
the move is from trusting “professional standards and expertise,”27 namely a 
shift from quality as determined by objective standards of scholarship, teaching, 
and service to “more explicit and measurable (or at least checkable) standards 
of performance,”28 for example, measurable “billable” academic hours.29 
The potentially destructive quality of timekeeping is its slippery slope, 
unleashing a monster within legal academia which begins with informing 
teaching, scholarship, and service, but may end up replacing substantive 
assessment of work with increased documentation requirements (such as 
detailed breakdown of academic hours) and an intensified organizational 
hierarchy and unintended bureaucracy.30  As Chad Oldfather explains, means 
of informational regulation can directly affect the regulated actor’s conduct, 
that is, “the very process of complying with a disclosure requirement 
can . . . lead to changes in the underlying activity.”31  Here, mandating 
timekeeping can affect the very work law professors do and abstain from doing, 
known as the “‘you manage what you measure’” effect.32  Imagine a world in 
which law professors, instead of engaging in contemplative intellectual work, 
are reduced to the role of near-clerks who are supervised by a technocratic 
manager or efficiency expert,33 otherwise known as an Associate Dean for 
Work Habits. 
 
26. Marianne Constable, Law and Language as Information Systems: Perish the Thought!, in 
SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 155, 166–67 (Justin Desautels-Stein & 
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017). 
27. Id. at 168 (quoting ALISON I. GRIFFITH & DOROTHY E. SMITH, UNDER NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT: INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHIES OF CHANGING FRONT-LINE WORK 7 (Allison I. 
Griffith & Dorothy E. Smith eds., 2014)).   
28. Id. 
29. See Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 19, 26 (2014) (reviewing the culture of academia and its intersection with recording time). 
30. Id. at 29. 
31. Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 
58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 783 (2006). 
32. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 299 (2001) (quoting Louis 
Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342 (1996)). 
33. See generally William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 
92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1983) (exploring the impact of increased formalized hierarchical structures, 
WALD 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:09 AM 
2018] THE ACADEMIC "BILLABLE" HOUR 1001 
Timekeeping may impact the very nature and culture of the academic 
enterprise, legal academia included.34  When law professors teach, research, 
and serve, the argument goes, they ought to be thinking about teaching, 
scholarship, and service, and not be concerned with, or even mindful of, the 
passage of time.  For example, when a law professor is mentoring a student or 
serving on a committee, her entire mental capacity ought to be devoted to the 
undertaking, whereas being mindful of the time might constitute a distraction 
negatively affecting the very underlying activity.  Quality-thoughtful research 
takes time, and timekeeping, with its implied message of push for efficiency 
and “doing more with less time,” is inherently inconsistent with its 
contemplative time-consuming nature. 
The argument—sometimes referred to as the Slow Professor movement35—
is that what law professors need to do (especially in the current day and age of 
calls for greater productivity and impact) is slow down and take the time to do 
their jobs well.  Quality teaching, researching, and service are inherently and 
constitutively contemplative, and timekeeping is inherently inconsistent with 
acting slowly, deliberatively, and thoughtfully.  The very exercise of 
timekeeping quantifies and commodifies the academic undertaking, making 
law professors more likely to impose artificial timelines and time restraints on 
tasks that ought not be so constrained. 
Moreover, arguably the diagnostic virtues of academic timekeeping are 
inherently connected to, and cannot be separated from, the dark side of 
recording time and its potentially destructive qualities.  Consider Annelise 
Riles’ law professor amateur.36  Professor Riles begins her account by 
observing that the American legal academy is amateuristic, home to law 
professors who “d[o] not read[,] . . . d[o] not take an interest in the 
details[,] . . . [and who] seem[] more engaged by acts of self-promotion than by 
the furthering of knowledge about the law.”37  Yet, rather than critique the law 
professor amateur,38 Riles celebrates her: “[T]he law professor’s ability to 
pontificate on just about anything without knowing much about the subject—a 
trait admired by students and vilified by academics in other fields—corresponds 
 
technocratic managerialism, and efficiency incentives on the operation and performance of complex 
organizations). 
34. See generally RHODE, IN PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 1–28 (discussing the 
academic mission in principle and practice).  
35. MAGGIE BERG & BARBARA K. SEEBER, THE SLOW PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE 
CULTURE OF SPEED IN THE ACADEMY, at ix–x (2016). 
36. Annelise Riles, Legal Amateurism, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 
499, 499–516 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017). 
37. Id. at 499. 
38. Id. at 511. 
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to a practical legal skill of lawyering.”39  Moreover, “what law professors do, 
when they behave amateuristically, is actually at the core of practical legal 
expertise.”40  Riles concludes that “[l]egal amateurism as practiced by legal 
academics is not a second-class version of philosophy or political science or 
economics in this view, but a virtuoso performance of professionalism,”41 a 
pedagogical game of aesthetic performance designed to help law students, 
judges, and policy makers master the skill of moving quickly from problem to 
problem and advising clients based on relative little knowledge of the 
particulars. 
Is Professor Riles right that law professors “d[o] not read” and “d[o] not 
take an interest in the details”?  Are U.S. law professors professional amateurs?  
We do not know because we do not know what law professors actually do.  Yet, 
if law professors were to record their time, we might find out.  But, cautions 
Riles, the very act of keeping time might undercut and ruin law professors’ 
amateurism.  “What legal amateurism achieves,” she writes, “is something at 
once miraculous and entirely mundane—it is simply a pause, a space to 
think.”42  Furthermore, “what lawyers or legal scholars really are doing is 
creating ‘open moments’ for their client, or students, or interlocutors to think.”43  
This is the essence, according to Riles, of legal academia.   
Timekeeping, however, is part of the “crisis around the nature and 
management of time,” the problem of not being able to secure the time to 
think.44  The dark side of timekeeping is that it threatens thinking and ushers in 
a managerial culture that looks suspiciously at “open moments,” creating 
incentives to spend time in more productive ways.45  In sum, and at the risk of 
overdoing the Star Wars metaphor, the very diagnostic virtues and force of 
timekeeping—allowing us to find out whether law professors are professional 
amateurs—carries with it a dark side of time management that undercuts 
thinking and time pauses—the very essence of legal amateurism.  Trying to 
document and study what law professors do may end up destroying the best of 
what law professors do.   
Is academic timekeeping a paradox?  Will trying to reap its diagnostic 
virtues likely unleash destructive forces that will ruin legal academia as we 
know it?  Perhaps not, given the different time horizons of the diagnostic and 
 
39. Id. at 505. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 505–06. 
42. Id. at 513.   
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 512. 
45. Id. at 512–13. 
WALD 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/10/18  10:09 AM 
2018] THE ACADEMIC "BILLABLE" HOUR 1003 
destructive qualities of timekeeping.  Generating diagnostic insights does not 
require making time recording a permanent feature of legal academia.  While 
developing best practices and benchmarks, building a knowledgebase for 
training and mentoring, and documenting work habit patterns across legal 
academia does entail a comprehensive exercise of timekeeping, the diagnostic 
insights can be generated by a time-limited grand experiment, say over a year’s 
time.  In contrast, the destructive forces of timekeeping, undermining the 
intellectual and contemplative culture of legal academia and undercutting 
spaces to think, are likely to take time, years, to play out.  One can imagine 
successfully navigating the diagnostic and destructive sides of academic 
timekeeping by simply casting it as a one-time, year-long experiment. 
On the other hand, the thought experiment about the academic “billable” 
hour is far from a straightforward proposition because both its diagnostic and 
destructive attributes depend on complex assumptions about legal academia 
and law professors.  The destructive dark side of timekeeping assumes that legal 
academia is an intellectual contemplative paradise of sorts, inhibited by law 
professors who spend their time thinking big thoughts about teaching, 
scholarship, and service.  What we know, however, about the quality, 
productivity, and impact of teaching, scholarship, and service suggests it is not 
so.  At the same time, the diagnostic virtues of timekeeping depend on 
assumptions about law professors, for example, that they will not cheat when 
recording their time.   
How does timekeeping affect professional enterprises?  Are law professors 
likely to cheat?  For clues and answers we might turn next to law practice and 
learn from the experience of lawyers with the billable hour. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE BILLABLE HOUR IN LAW PRACTICE 
While the lure of finding out what law professors do may be compelling, 
requiring law professors to record their time ought to take account of the many 
critiques of the billable hour in law practice.  The billable hour has been 
characterized as a disincentive to efficient practice; a cause of over-lawyering 
and even fraudulent billing practices; a reason for work-life concerns, and even 
outright lawyer unhappiness; a reason for decreased mentorships and reduced 
investments in junior lawyers and public service; and a negative factor souring 
the legal profession’s culture.46  If these ills are true and if they would equally 
 
46. Professor Susan Fortney has been a thoughtful vocal critic of the billable hour.  See Fortney, 
Soul for Sale, supra note 20, at 281–82; Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to be Ethical, supra note 20, at 
310; Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby, supra note 20, at 179; see also Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a 
Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 871, 889 (1999) [hereinafter Schiltz, Unethical Profession].  Douglas Richmond, in contrast, 
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apply to legal academia, perhaps timekeeping should not be imported by law 
professors. 
The billable hour became increasingly common between the 1950s and 
1970s,47 introduced by lawyers seeking higher compensation who wanted to 
replace gentlemanly understandings about the value of legal services with fees 
calculated as the product of lucrative hourly rates and hours spent serving 
clients.48  Notwithstanding its self-serving nature, the billable hour changed the 
landscape of the attorney-client relationship in terms of transparency: instead 
of obscure bills for “services rendered,” billable hours allowed clients a window 
into what their lawyers were doing.49  As between clients and lawyers, the 
innovation of the billable hour effectively married market incentives and 
transparency, quickly becoming an accepted standard. 
At law firms, the billable hour served additional functions.  Not only was it 
used to charge clients for partners’ and associates’ time, but it served as an 
internal monitoring and governance procedure.  Partners could use associates’ 
recorded time not only to bill clients, but also to assess the performance and 
progress of associates.  Similarly, partners could observe and monitor their 
counterparts’ time to ensure against shirking.50  Yet, the benefits of 
timekeeping—an effective and transparent means of billing, and serving as an 
internal monitoring mechanism within firms—did not come without 
disadvantages.   
First, the billable hour constitutes a disincentive for being efficient: a smart, 
fast lawyer who can complete a task in thirty minutes can only bill a client for 
half an hour, whereas a slower, less efficient lawyer who takes twice the time 
is able to bill double, seemingly punishing the faster lawyer for her efficiency.  
The efficiency disincentive is less pronounced when lawyers are busy: the more 
efficient lawyer will bill as many hours as she’d like, whereas the inefficient 
attorney will fall behind; it is more troubling when lawyers are not fully 
 
has been an astute defender of the billable hour, or more accurately, a skeptic observer of critiques of 
it.  See Douglas R. Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, PROF. LAW., Winter 2003, at 1, 1 
[hereinafter Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour]; Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm 
Economy, Billable Hours, and Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 210 (2000). 
47. ROSS, supra note 19, at 17. 
48. Id. at 16–17. 
49. Joseph T. Bernstein, In Defense of the Billable Hour, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2007, at 67, 68. 
50. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 100; Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Relational 
Infrastructure of the Law Firm Culture and Regulation: The Exaggerated Death of Big Law, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 109, 131 (2013); Stephen Lilley, The Hard Work of “Hard Work”: The Legal Elite’s 
Rhetoric of Diligence and the Professionalization of the Law, 1850–1920, 17 WIDENER L.J. 145, 154 
(2007) (describing the billable hour as an instrument used by law firms to monitor the performance of 
their lawyers). 
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employed because the more efficient lawyer will work less and bill less.51  Some 
fee policies can mitigate the effects of the efficiency disincentive.  For example, 
more efficient lawyers can charge a higher hourly rate than less efficient 
lawyers,52 but only if clients and partners can observe the faster or better quality 
of the more efficient lawyer. 
Second and relatedly, the billable hour provides a reason to over-lawyer 
assignments.  A lawyer paid by the hour or having to meet billable targets has 
an incentive to explore every aspect of every issue, leaving no stone unturned, 
whereas an attorney not compensated hourly is better positioned to make 
professional judgment calls about concluding work on a matter when the 
marginal benefit to the client is negligible.53  This incentive could be mitigated 
by helping lawyers acquire professional skills and hone professional 
judgment,54 which would allow them to make reasonable and informed 
judgments about how much time to spend on a matter by investing in the 
formation of their professional identity as ethical lawyers who act consistent 
with clients’ best interests.   
Third, the billable hour triggers a concern about fraud, creating an incentive 
for lawyers to over-state their time to increase their compensation (or to meet 
their billable targets) when the client (or the partner) cannot directly observe 
their time.55  As is the case with over-lawyering, the incentive to over-bill can 
be mitigated by investments in the professional identity of individual lawyers 
and in the ethical culture and infrastructure of law firms.56  Market controls, 
such as lawyers’ reputations for integrity, as well as statutory controls, like rules 
 
51. See Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, supra note 46, at 5. 
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
53. Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, supra note 46, at 1. 
54. Professor Neil Hamilton has been a leader in the study of the formation of professional 
identity and its impact on lawyers’ conduct. See generally Neil Hamilton & Sarah Schaefer, What 
Legal Education Can Learn from Medical Education about Competency-Based Learning Outcomes 
Including Those Related to Professional Formation and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
399 (2016); Neil Hamilton & Jerome M. Organ, Thirty Reflection Questions to Help Each Student Find 
Meaningful Employment and Develop an Integrated Professional Identity (Professional Formation), 
83 TENN. L. REV. 843 (2016); Neil W. Hamilton, Changing Markets Create Opportunities: 
Emphasizing the Competencies Legal Employers Use in Hiring New Lawyers (Including Professional 
Formation/Professionalism), 65 S.C. L. REV. 547 (2014). 
55. Richmond, In Defense of the Billable Hour, supra note 46, at 1. 
56. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 559, 
566 (2002); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in 
Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 692 (2002); Elizabeth 
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
335, 342–43 (2003). 
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of professional conduct and regulatory enforcement (for example, discipline) 
also alleviate concerns about cheating.  
Two developments have aggravated the disadvantages of the billable hour: 
the increasingly direct linkage between the billable hour and compensation and 
escalating billable targets.  For some lawyers, there has always been a direct 
link between the billable hour and compensation.  Solo practitioners, for 
example, have long had their compensation tied to the billable hour in the sense 
that additional billed hours led to higher compensation and lower hours resulted 
in lower pay.  For others, however, the relationship has been less direct.  Large 
law firm associates—indeed, associates in general—usually receive a set salary 
irrespective of billable hours.  Of course, law firms big and small often set 
explicit or implicit billable targets and those who fail to meet their expectancies 
may experience pressures to bill more or be at risk of losing their jobs, but 
compensation itself was not directly linked to billable hours.  Similarly, partners 
often had hard or soft billable targets and failure to meet them may have led, 
over time, to adjustment in compensation, but generally there was no direct link 
between billable hours and compensation.  Indeed, the relationship may have 
been counterintuitive: rainmakers or “finders” who spent considerable amount 
of time on business development may have ended up billing less for actual legal 
work but experienced no decline in compensation, quite the contrary.57 
Yet, as law firms have begun to more explicitly focus on the financial 
bottom line, the relationship between billable hours and compensation has 
grown increasingly more direct.58  Not only have bonuses at some firms become 
directly linked to billable hour targets for both associates and partners, but 
failure to meet billable targets has led to more immediate and direct 
consequences in terms of compensation.  Relatedly, as the “eat what you kill” 
culture became more widespread, law firms concerned with profitability and its 
perception began to increase the billable targets for associates and sometimes 
for partners as well.59   
The combined effect of these two trends has led to several well documented 
negative consequences.  Commentators argue that increased billable targets 
more directly connected to compensation have led to an unhealthy and 
unsustainable work-life balance at BigLaw and outside of it.60  Lawyers 
 
57. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of 
the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1898 (2008); William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of 
Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1694–95 (2006). 
58. Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future 
of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 44, 70 (2011). 
59. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL 7 (2006). 
60. Id. at 287. 
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incentivized to work longer and longer hours have found themselves with fewer 
personal hours and a professional life increasingly crowding out the personal.  
This, in turn, has led to purported increased unhappiness and dissatisfaction 
among lawyers that is attributed to the billable hour.61   
Increased billable targets informing compensation also lead to negative 
incentives to mentor and train junior associates because every hour of 
mentoring and training is an hour not billed to a client.62  Finally, the trends fuel 
concerns about inequities and reduced diversity in the legal profession: the 
decline of training and mentorship and emphasis on the billable hour mean that 
those who can fend for themselves, for example, those endowed with ample 
relationships and know how about the firm—historically, white heterosexual 
men—are more likely to succeed than those who have smaller endowments of 
social and cultural capital and are disproportionately affected by diminished 
training and mentorship.63  
Importantly, for lawyers, the negative consequences associated with the 
billable hour and aggravated by a heightened focus on the financial bottom line 
and increased billable targets are all grounded in and are the result of the 
inherent connection between keeping time and billing it to clients.  That is, none 
of these negative consequences follow from lawyers’ timekeeping.  Rather, 
they follow from the tie between recording time and billing it, leading to 
compensation consequences.  For law professors, and this is key, there is no 
such inherent relationship between recording time and compensation, and no 
reason to tie timekeeping with monetary consequences.  As opposed to 
practicing lawyers, law professors can have all the benefits associated with 
timekeeping—generating data about work habits—without any of the negative 
consequences associated with billing the time—inefficiencies, over-lawyering, 
over-billing, work-life challenges, decreased training and mentorship, and 
diminished equality and diversity. 
A. Cheating and Time Padding64:  
Separating the Diagnostic from the Punitive 
To begin with, there is some irony in worrying about law professors’ 
cheating and time padding.  Law professors spend their time training and 
 
61. Schiltz, Unethical Profession, supra note 46, at 889–90; Richmond, In Defense of the 
Billable Hour, supra note 46, at 5. 
62. Fortney, Soul for Sale, supra note 20, at 281–82; Fortney, I Don’t Have Time to be Ethical, 
supra note 20, at 310; Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby, supra note 20, at 179.   
63. Wald, supra note 23, at 2509; Wald, supra note 25, at 21. 
64. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, CHEATING: ETHICS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 75–91 (2017) 
(analyzing cheating in the academic setting). 
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preparing lawyers, many of whom will regularly keep their time, to practice, on 
the fundamental assumption that lawyers can and should act honestly and avoid 
over-billing clients, the contrary pressures and incentives notwithstanding.  If 
law professors believe that most or even many lawyers cannot and do not keep 
time honestly because such practice is not possible, they should not be teaching 
at law schools and should not be sending their students to an unavoidable and 
inevitable corrupting profession.  Law professors, as a condition for acting 
morally in their role as law professors, must therefore believe that ethical 
timekeeping is possible for lawyers. 
Next, two lessons emerge from the analysis of lawyers’ billable hour.  First, 
if ethical timekeeping is possible for practicing lawyers,65 it is surely possible 
for law professors who do not experience nearly the pressures and incentives 
lawyers face to over-bill.  In any event, the same professional training, policies, 
procedures, and mechanisms used to combat the threat of over-billing in the 
practice of law, from the development of ethical professional identity to 
oversight and monitoring, could be deployed in legal academia.  Yet, learning 
from law practice suggests that academic timekeeping should not be put in 
place, permanently or even as an experiment, before appropriate training in 
ethical timekeeping is offered and an oversight apparatus (for example, spot 
checking), is conceived of to reduce the probability of cheating.66 
Second, if lawyers over-bill, they do so to enhance their compensation, 
meet billable targets, or because they are greedy, none of which apply to law 
professors whose compensation is not (and should not be) tied to the billable 
hour.  If academic timekeeping was to be detached from compensation, law 
professors would simply have little financial reason to over-bill.  The lesson 
from law practice here is the importance of separating the diagnostic aspects of 
timekeeping from its potential punitive consequences, such as adverse effects 
on compensation.  If law professors knew that their timekeeping data would not 
affect their compensation in any way, the incentive to cheat would be greatly 
reduced. 
Moreover, even if in the long run—after law professors’ aggregate time 
recording was used to generate benchmarks for effective academic practice and 
best practices—timekeeping was to be used to inform law professors’ 
compensation decisions at some law schools, it would still not generate the kind 
of negative incentives practicing lawyers routinely experience because law 
 
65. Schiltz, Unethical Profession, supra note 46, at 950. 
66. See supra note 56.  In terms of informational regulation, thinking about training and investing 
in timekeeping infrastructure before rushing to implement any specific program would be a form of 
informational design.  See generally William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure 
Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1781–83 (1999). 
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schools would also have additional data points to assess the performance of 
their faculty members like number of classes taught, student evaluations, 
contact hours, committee service, number of scholarly publications and their 
quality, etc.  The combined effect of putting in place an apparatus to ensure 
ethical timekeeping and divorcing the diagnostic insights from punitive 
compensation consequences might go a long way toward reducing concerns 
about the academic “billable” hour.   
B. The Cost of Timekeeping 
In the short run, during the aggregate data gathering stage generating 
collective benchmarks and best policies regarding work habits, individual law 
professors will not benefit from timekeeping.  Only once the aggregate data has 
been collected and mined will individual faculty members benefit from the 
insights generated to assess, inform, and improve their work habits. 
Admittedly, in the short run, while they are not benefiting from the 
undertaking, law professors will incur a cost related to timekeeping, namely, 
lost timekeeping time.  Notably, while lawyers routinely keep time, they do so 
out of necessity and in return get paid such that the cost of timekeeping is more 
than offset by the benefits of it, especially given that no cheaper alternatives for 
billing clients have emerged as an effective substitute for the billable hour.67 
For law professors, in contrast, time lost to recording time is in the short 
run a net cost, time taken away from other more productive tasks, such as 
teaching, service, and scholarship.  Once again, however, learning from the 
experience of practicing lawyers can benefit law professors.  Practically 
speaking, there are many timekeeping programs available in the marketplace to 
allow law professors to begin recording their time immediately and 
conveniently.  Just as lawyers and law firms have developed conventions about 
timekeeping categories and matters, so can law professors.  Indeed, given that 
the main objective of academic timekeeping is generating aggregate data, it is 
imperative to develop, in advance, agreed-upon categories such that all law 
professors can keep time consistently and universally.68   
For purposes of this Essay, it is unnecessary to spell out the final details of 
academic timekeeping.  No doubt, law professors will track time for at least the 
three major components of their job: teaching, service, and scholarship.  
Teaching may include categories such as classroom instruction, classroom 
preparation, student contact hours, and supervision.  Service may include 
 
67. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2112 (2010). 
68. Devising in advance universal categories of timekeeping for all law professors to record 
constitutes a form of informational design.  See Sage, supra note 66. 
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categories such as committee service, university service, administrative tasks, 
student mentoring, collegial mentoring, pro bono work, Continuing Legal 
Education and community talks, intellectual exchanges (such as commenting 
on others’ work), and public service.  Scholarship categories may include 
researching, writing, participating in conferences, and presenting one’s work.  
Additional categories may include consulting, expert work, etc.   
Regular daily timekeeping will take some time getting used to, especially 
given how foreign it is to academic work, and law professors will be able to 
benefit from training materials readily available in law practice.  Over time, 
however, the imposition on law professors’ time and thus the cost of 
timekeeping is likely minimal.  Lawyers do not report the actual time spent 
keeping time as a significant imposition, and law professors, even those who 
have not practiced law and have no previous experience keeping time, will 
easily adjust to the commitment.  To further reduce the cost of recording 
academic time, law professors could keep their time in thirty-minute units as 
opposed to the customary six-minute units observed by lawyers.  While the 
latter divide each hour into ten parts to efficiently bill clients, law professors 
could collectively gain ample knowledge about work habits in two hourly 
increments.   
C. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Timekeeping 
The only “agenda” of timekeeping is to generate work habit aggregate data 
to inform and improve the professional lives of law professors and inform 
institutional decisions by law schools about time allocation of their faculties.  
The “billable” hour thought experiment does not assume that some law 
professors are not working hard enough.  It does not aim to expose such a 
contingent or incentivize it to work harder.69  In fact, diagnostic timekeeping 
entails no normative assumptions about how hard law professors ought or ought 
not work.   
Rather than assuming a problem, time recording is motivated by a desire to 
generate aggregate data about what law professors do and how they do it, such 
that best practices and benchmarks can be developed to allow both individual 
law professors and institutional actors—law schools—to make more informed 
decisions about how to spend time and how to assess it, alongside the existing 
measures of quality, productivity, and impact.   
 
69. See generally Colleen Flaherty, So Much to Do, So Little Time, INSIDE HIGHER ED (April 9, 
2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/09/research-shows-professors-work-long-
hours-and-spend-much-day-meetings [https://perma.cc/FLW2-QMB6] (reporting on research that 
finds that professors work increasingly long and longer hours). 
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While it is the most successful law professors, the best teachers, the best 
institutional actors, and the best scholars that we have the most to learn from in 
terms of how they spend their time, exactly because we do not know how much 
time law professors spend at work or how they spend it, we have a lot to learn 
from collecting data about the work habits of all law professors, generating data 
about best practices to follow, worst practices to avoid, and benchmarks for 
particular tasks.  Accordingly, academic time recording must be mandatory and 
collected pursuant to universal standards, even if it is put in place as a time-
limited experiment. 
Because we know so little about what law professors do and how they do 
it, voluntary time recording will be better than having no data at all.  Voluntary 
and sporadic timekeeping, however, will not allow us to generate the aggregate 
data we need to produce insights regarding best practices and effective work 
habits.  We need all law professors to record their time so we can have an 
understanding of how time is spent, and in turn, how to spend it more effectively 
and equally. 
D. Autonomy and Academic Freedom   
Many professors value professional autonomy and academic freedom as 
defining and fundamental values of academic life.  Law professors often do not 
have control over what classes they teach, but they do have control over what 
and how they teach their courses (academic freedom), and they generally 
exercise near full control over their scholarship and service roles.  Timekeeping, 
while not directly infringing on professors’ autonomy and academic freedom, 
may nonetheless inform and shape these values.  For example, if law professors 
were to keep time, some might shy away from teaching innovative time-
consuming classes for fear of being perceived as inefficient teachers who spend 
too many hours preparing for class, or might shy away from complex and time-
consuming research projects for fear of being perceived as under-productive 
scholars. 
The concern that timekeeping might impact law professors’ choices 
regarding their time is an important one.  Indeed, the objective of timekeeping 
is to generate insights meant to inform and empower law professors’ choices 
regarding their time and not to impede them, but at the same time concerns 
about autonomy and academic freedom should not be over-stated. 
First, as Stanley Fish compellingly argues, “Independence from external 
impositions cannot mean that faculty members are unconstrained by a standard, 
and the standard that constrains them is not something faculty members should 
be free to nominate. . . . Freedom to teach . . . does not mean the freedom to say 
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anything and call it teaching.”70  Similarly, the freedom to do scholarship does 
not mean the freedom to do nothing or anything and call it scholarship.  
Moreover, academic freedom properly understood, that is, the independence 
from external impositions, cannot mean that faculty members are unconstrained 
by a scholarly standard, and the standard that constrains them is not something 
faculty members should be free to nominate.  Thus, to the extent that 
timekeeping constitutes a constraint on law professors’ autonomy and academic 
freedom, the concern ought to be taken seriously while remembering that 
autonomy and academic freedom are not absolute values and that not every 
imposition on them is by definition unreasonable or undesirable. 
Second, timekeeping is not a direct imposition on autonomy and academic 
freedom.  It does not tell law professors how much time to work and how to 
spend it.  Rather, it may indirectly shape and inform law professors’ allocation 
of time in terms of what projects they may undertake or eschew.  Indirect 
incentives in academia are not uncommon: some professors choose to teach 
overloads, either for additional pay or so they can bank credits and take some 
time off to pursue other academic tasks.  Others who work in schools that 
provide financial incentives for publishing articles in top journals might eschew 
book projects, instead preferring to write articles and collect the bounties or 
attempt to write articles that are more likely to place in highly ranked journals. 
Still, were law professors to record their time, it would be important to 
design timekeeping categories in a manner that would be unlikely to chill 
certain academic tasks and choices.  Practicing lawyers experience pressure to 
bill their time to clients, chilling time spent on pro bono work, administrative 
tasks, training and mentoring, and service activities.  While as long as academic 
timekeeping would be divorced from compensation consequences there would 
be no directly analogous reason to deter law professors from “billing” time to 
activities such as thinking about their research or developing new teaching 
techniques; recognizing such tasks as legitimate categories of timekeeping on 
par with activities such as “writing” and “teaching” could counteract the 
indirect incentive of timekeeping to avoid “thinking” as an unproductive 
activity and minimize its impact on autonomy and academic freedom. 
Finally, as far as timekeeping may adversely affect autonomy and academic 
freedom, it should be noted that relative loss of autonomy and academic 
freedom by individual professors is already an ongoing phenomenon.71  The 
 
70. Stanley Fish, A Simple Moral: Know Your Job and Do It, 36 J.C. & U.L. 313, 317 (2009). 
71. Pat Schneider, Regents Proposal: UW Will Track Professors’ Teaching Hours Starting in 
January, CAP TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), 
http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/education/university/regents-proposal-uw-will-track-
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corporatization of both academia in general and legal education in particular 
impacts the role and work of law professors.72  Nor is the phenomenon unique 
to academic lawyers: attorneys, for example, partners at large law firms, have 
long experienced the relative decline of individual autonomy and 
corresponding rise in the power of centralized decision-making by the firm and 
of administrators within it, as well as by increasingly powerful clients and their 
in-house lawyers.73 
IV. THE POLITICS OF ACADEMIC TIMEKEEPING  
Not too much imagination is needed to recognize that academic 
timekeeping might be used by enemies of the academy, such as hostile 
legislators, to criticize professors and advance political agendas.  For example, 
in December of 2017, a proposal pending before the University of Wisconsin’s 
Board of Regents called for the adoption of a policy monitoring the number of 
hours faculty spend teaching and rewarding professors who teach more than a 
standard academic load,74 arguably motivated in part by opponents of 
(“liberal”) scholarship seeking to curtail it. 
The proposal appears to suffer from several significant flaws.  To begin 
with, it does not purport to measure teaching work habits but scrutinizes only 
one aspect of teaching in isolation, namely in-class instruction.75  Yet, as this 
Essay explains, we already know professors’ teaching loads.  What we do not 
know and ought to find out more about is exactly what the proposal excludes: 
how much time and how professors prepare for class, how much time and how 
they spend time with students outside of the classroom, and how much time and 
how they spend time preparing, grading, and providing feedback to students.  
 
professors-teaching-hours-starting-in/article_6113739b-6627-565b-a5f0-53b89e3147de.html 
[https://perma.cc/K3HT-MZF5]. 
72. BERG & SEEBER, supra note 35, at x. 
73. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 378–79 (1993) (discussing the decline in 
lawyers’ autonomy); Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and 
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 494 (1989) (exploring the rise of in-house lawyers 
and their increased prestige and power); Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
749, 760 (2010); Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 415 (2012) (examining the loss of 
power and autonomy of outside counsel to in-house lawyers and their corporate entity clients). 
74. Schneider, supra note 71.  While uncommon, Wisconsin is not the first state to attempt to 
impose timekeeping requirements on academics.  Pursuant to a 2003 Illinois statute titled State 
Officials and Employees Ethics Act, all state employees, including university faculty, have to 
“periodically submit time sheets documenting the time spent each day on official state business.”  
Enforcement of this mandate has reportedly been inconsistent.  See Amien Essif, Told to Clock Their 
Hours, Some Illinois Professors Protest, IN THESE TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/16202/told_to_clock_their_hours_some_illinois_professors_p
rotest [https://perma.cc/E28J-GNBP].  
75. Schneider, supra note 71. 
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As one faculty member noted colorfully in response to the proposal, “The 
Packers don’t just work three hours on Sunday.”76 
Next, the proposal focuses on one component of teaching to the exclusion 
of assessing time committed to scholarship and service.77  As such, it risks 
generating partial and misleading information about what professors at the 
University of Wisconsin do. 
Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, by purporting to reward professors 
who teach more than a standard academic load, the proposal introduces the very 
tie between recorded time and compensation78 that this Essay cautions against: 
the evil of the billable hour.  Worse, the proposal introduces the tie in a manner 
that is likely to undermine quality teaching and undercut scholarship and 
service.  One rewarded solely based on course loads faces an incentive to spend 
more time teaching and less time preparing classes and interacting with 
students, let alone researching and serving. 
The shortcomings of the proposal notwithstanding, one can easily imagine 
that legislators supporting it or other measures like it might seize on this Essay 
and its thought experiment and mischaracterize it as supportive of their agenda 
of imposing in-class teaching targets at the expense of research, service, and 
other valuable aspects of teaching. 
The likely political consequences of academic timekeeping, its possible 
manipulation and abuse included, certainly constitute a legitimate part of our 
thought experiment about the academic “billable” hour.  If one thought, for 
example, that the costs associated with keeping time, namely increased political 
scrutiny that may result in pressure on research and service and the undermining 
of quality teaching, were likely to outweigh the benefits of enhanced knowledge 
about law professors’ work habits and improved scholarship, teaching, and 
service, one might reasonably conclude that the world we live in now would be 
superior to an imaginary world in which timekeeping was the norm.   
More generally, should a legal scholar abstain from even suggesting a 
thought experiment that might be used to undercut legal scholarship?  “Our 
thoughts are ours; their ends, none of our own,” Stanley Fish reminds us.79  
“[A]s we work things out, we are responsible for the product of that activity.  
What then happens, when and if the fruits of our labors are put out into the 
world, is not something that we can control . . . .”80  Fish adds that “when I’m 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Transcript, supra note 22, at 1098 (Stanley Fish) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET act 3, sc. 2). 
80. Id. 
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doing scholarship, . . . I’m trying to get it right.  I don’t know what ‘it’ is and it 
varies in complexities of it certainly, but I’m trying to get it right.”81  Yet, while 
the impact of scholarship and thought experiments is in this sense always 
contingent and outside the control of the scholar, “there are, of course, many 
ways in which you [as a scholar] try desperately to control [the uses of your 
scholarship].”82 
In thinking about what law professors do, how little we know about their 
work habits, and how important and valuable it would be to learn more about 
how legal academia is practiced, getting “it” right includes imagining the 
possibility of academic timekeeping, exploring both its likely benefits and 
costs.  The quite real possibility that such a thought experiment might be used 
by enemies of legal academia to ridicule and denounce academic work, and in 
particular, to curtail and challenge the value and quality of academic research, 
does not mean it ought not be pursued.  It does mean, however, that one might 
attempt to prevent the manipulation or abuse of the thought experiment, for 
example, by pointing out how particular timekeeping proposals are inconsistent 
with it.83 
Another way of responding to likely political consequences is to limit the 
thought exercise to law professors as opposed to academics working in other 
disciplines.  Law schools and their professors tend to be relatively insulated 
from pressures affecting other parts of the university.  For example, whereas 
many professors outside of law schools experience increased pressures to 
teach,84 at some law schools professors have recently been teaching less, with 
typical teaching loads decreasing from a standard annual load of twelve to 
eleven, ten, or even nine credits.85  This is not to suggest, of course, that law 
schools are immune to political pressures, such as attacks on legal clinics and 
the types of clients and cases they represent,86 but rather to point out that law 
schools and their faculties may be better positioned to withstand political 
pressures compared to their university counterparts. 
 
81. Id.   
82. Id. 
83. See supra notes 71, 75–78 and accompanying text. 
84. BERG & SEEBER, supra note 35, at 28. 
85. See Faculty Teaching Loads, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/12/faculty-teaching-loads.html 
[https://perma.cc/58UE-R3HN].  
86. Steven Bender, Legal Clinics Under Attack, SALT (April 5, 2010), 
https://www.saltlaw.org/legal-clinics-under-attack/ [https://perma.cc/5LH7-W8Z4]; Ian Urbina, 
School Law Clinics Face a Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (April 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/us/04lawschool.html?emc=eta1 [http://perma.cc/AD8B-DYT7]. 
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V. THE NORMATIVE INSIGHTS OF TIMEKEEPING 
What should law professors be doing?87  Should law professors spend most 
of their time researching and publishing?  Or teaching and interacting with 
students as mentors?88  Or serving the public interest?89  Should law teaching 
be a one-size-fits-all, in which all law professors are held to the same 
expectations in terms of teaching, scholarship, and service, or should different 
standards apply to different categories of professors?90  Should law professors 
stay involved in law practice, or at least engage in consulting or pursue expert 
work, pro bono or for profit, to stay current?  Should law professors focus on 
training students to become lawyers?91  Or leaders?92  Or assume “JD-
advantage” roles alongside or instead of those of traditional lawyers?  Should 
all law professors work similar hours?  Should law schools offer part-time 
arrangements to their full-time faculty?93  Should all law professors dedicate 
time to scholarship?94  Should different role contributions weigh equally at law 
schools?   
Legal education is at a crossroads, and disagreement abounds regarding 
many of these questions.95  These and similar decisions, however, would be 
better made if they were based on actual timekeeping data, documenting law 
professors’ teaching, service, and scholarly habits and time commitments.  
Diagnostic descriptive insights of timekeeping, to be sure, ought to inform and 
empower the discourse rather than decide normative choices, both individually 
 
87. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (1990) (questioning the assumption and costs of having law professors 
teach and write). 
88. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 59 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 
2012). 
89. Luban, supra note 17, at 58. 
90. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, supra note 4, at 1357–58. 
91. Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 135. 
92. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 1 (2013). 
93. See generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX: TIME NORMS, 
PROFESSIONAL LIVES, FAMILY, AND GENDER 3–5 (1999) (discussing time norms, professional lives, 
family, and gender and the how these aspects change in the context of part-time professional 
employment); SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, OFF-RAMPS AND ON-RAMPS: KEEPING TALENTED WOMEN ON 
THE ROAD TO SUCCESS 29–30 (2007) (discussing the role that part-time employment can play in the 
context of a professional woman’s life). 
94. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, supra note 4, at 1331. 
95. See generally, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE 
DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 1–42 (2014); TAMANAHA, supra note 88; Deborah L. Rhode, Legal 
Education: Rethinking the Problem, Reimagining the Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2013); Eli Wald 
& Russell G. Pearce, Making Good Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 403–07 (2011); Eli Wald, The 
Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming Jan. 
2018). 
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and institutionally.  Yet finding out what law professors actually do and how 
they do it should certainly inform these important ongoing normative 
discussions.  The challenges law schools face are complex enough and there is 
little reason to compound them by having decisions made under conditions of 
empirical uncertainty as to what law professors are actually doing.  Additional 
data, especially if gathered by means of a timekeeping national experiment as 
opposed to a permanent arrangement,96 may inform and improve the quality of 
the normative decisions law schools are facing. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, it is critical to the effectiveness of 
any timekeeping scheme that it be grounded in thoughtful informational design, 
including universal categories of recorded time and training meant to minimize 
instances of cheating.  The normative uncertainty clouding the future of legal 
academia introduces a chicken and an egg design problem: a lack of consensus 
concerning the normative objectives of law schools can thus thwart the 
development of a scheme of informational regulation by preventing agreement 
on what time categories law professors should record or by inducing 
compromises that may result in either incomplete or inapposite timekeeping.97  
Yet normative uncertainty notwithstanding, and even in the face of divergent 
models of legal education emerging, we have a core conceptual understanding 
of what it is that law professors do.  We just do not know whether and how law 
professors go about doing their job, and timekeeping will reveal invaluable 
diagnostic data that in turn may inform normative choices.   
VI. CONCLUSION   
Academic timekeeping by law professors can generate useful insights about 
work habits that may inform and improve legal academia.  If all law professors 
were to record their time teaching, serving, and researching based on agreed-
upon time categories, we would know more about what law professors do and 
how they do it and would be able to generate benchmarks and best practices, 
which may inform individual decision-making by faculty members regarding 
how to allocate their time, as well as institutional decision-making by law 
schools about how to assess and allocate their human capital resources and how 
to effectively train and mentor junior colleagues. 
Timekeeping, however, also has a dark, destructive side, as it may undercut 
the intellectual and contemplative culture of legal academia and may help create 
disincentives for thinking, unintentionally triggering and contributing to a 
process of replacing standards of quality and professional excellence with 
 
96. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text explaining the different time horizons of the 
diagnostic and destructive qualities of timekeeping. 
97. Oldfather, supra note 31, at 786–87. 
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managerial reporting of hours.  Indeed, the two sides of timekeeping, the 
diagnostic and destructive, may be inherently intertwined such that the very act 
of keeping academic time may undercut the core mission and objectives of legal 
academia.   
Law practice and lawyers’ experience with the billable hour suggests some 
valuable lessons in terms of thinking about academic timekeeping.  Scrutiny of 
the disadvantages of the billable hour in law practice reveals that they result to 
a significant degree from the tie between recorded time and compensation—a 
necessary and inherent relationship in law practice, which is unnecessary in 
legal academia.  Law professors’ timekeeping does not and should not play a 
significant role in compensation decisions; rather, it should inform work habit 
decisions of individual law professors and law schools.  Divorcing the 
diagnostic from the punitive—that is, mandating academic timekeeping while 
liberating law professors from any compensation consequences attached to 
recorded time—may help address some of the concerns regarding the dark side 
of timekeeping by reducing the incentives of law professors to cheat.  
Moreover, the experience of lawyers with the formation of professional identity 
as well as the development of policies and procedures meant to encourage 
ethical timekeeping could be used in legal academia to render the diagnostic 
virtues of timekeeping more likely.  Thus, a time-limited, mandatory national 
experiment with academic timekeeping based on universally agreed-upon time 
categories, supported by an apparatus of ethical timekeeping, and divorced 
from compensation consequences may avail legal academia of the diagnostic 
virtues of timekeeping while keeping its destructive qualities at bay. 
Admittedly, recording time may provide enemies of the academia with 
powerful ammunition.  It may, for example, be used by critics to demand 
increased teaching loads and restrict investment in research.  Yet continued 
ignorance about what law professors do may be too high a price to pay for a 
false sense of security.  Moreover, robust knowledge about law professors’ 
work habits may inform normative discussions about what law professors 
should be doing, an important contribution given that such normative 
discussions are upon us.   
